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On the (So Called) Problem of Detail: 
Michael Fried, Roland Barthes, and Roger Scruton on Photography 
and Intentionality  
 
The photographer… who aims for an aesthetically significant representation 
must also aim to control detail; ‘detail’ being here understood in the wide sense 
of ‘any observable fact or feature.’ But here lies a fresh difficulty. The causal 
process of which the photographer is a victim puts almost every detail outside 
of his control. Even if he does, say, intentionally arrange each fold of his 
subject’s dress and meticulously construct, as studio photographers once used 
to do, the appropriate scenario, that would still hardly be relevant, since there 
seem to be few ways in which such intentions can be revealed in the 
photograph.  
   
Roger Scruton, “Photography and Representation” 
 
There is no detail in photography. 
 
Jeff Wall, NGV Melbourne, Jan 13, 2015 
 
1. The Problem: Scruton, Barthes, and Fried on Detail in Photography1 
 
As anyone reading a volume devoted to Michael Fried and philosophy will know, 
Roger Scruton is not – to put it weakly – the kind of philosopher with whom Fried 
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would typically be associated.2 Even setting broader questions of philosophical 
orientation, tradition, and temperament aside, and focusing solely on their respective 
claims about photography: Scruton is photography’s arch aesthetic sceptic, Fried the 
leading champion of its newly elevated artistic status and centrality.  
 
Scruton’s scepticism regarding photography’s status as a ‘representational art,’ 
where this requires the fully articulated expression of thoughts about what is depicted, 
pivots on his claim that the mechanics of photographic image-generation restrict 
photographers’ ability to control detail throughout the image. Because automatically 
captured images do not admit of non-systematic selection – that is, selection 
according to parameters subjectively determined by the agent, rather than engineered 
into the apparatus, film stock or software – one can never be certain what to attribute 
significance to in the resulting image. Much of what appears may only do so because 
it was in shot alongside the intended subject, and this undermines our confidence 
about what the photographer intended to communicate. Should we take everything in 
the image as relevant to its intended meaning? What about the out of focus shrubbery 
in the background, the stones along the roadside, faint signs of wear on the furniture, 
or grime on a shirt cuff? The photograph itself does not tell us whether the 
photographer even noticed them, or so the standard story goes. This has been a 
recurrent worry in reflection on photography.3  
 
Lee Friedlander put it this way: 
 
I only wanted Uncle Vern standing by his new car (a Hudson) on a clear 
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day. I got him and the car. I also got a bit of Aunt Mary's laundry, and 
Beau Jack, the dog, peeing on a fence, and a row of potted tuberous 
begonias on the porch and 78 trees and a million pebbles in the driveway 
and more. It's a generous medium, photography.4 
 
As often as photography has been criticized, down the years, by conservative critics 
such as Elizabeth Eastlake and Scruton for putting such minutiae beyond the reach of 
photographers, however, it has been celebrated for just the same reason. Thus Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, a contemporary of Eastlake’s: 
 
This distinctness of the lesser details of a building or a landscape often 
gives us incidental truths which interest us more than the central object of 
the picture… The very things which an artist would leave out, or render 
imperfectly, the photograph takes infinite care with.5 
 
Or take Fried himself: 
 
Barthes’s observation… that the detail that strikes him as a punctum 
could not do so had it been intended as such by the photographer is an 
anti-theatrical claim in that it implies a fundamental distinction, which 
goes back to Diderot, between ‘seeing’ and ‘being shown.’ The punctum, 
one might say, is seen by Barthes, but not because it has been shown to 
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him by the photographer, for whom it does not exist; as Barthes 
recognizes, “it occurs [only] in the field of the photographed thing,” 
which is to say that it is a pure artefact of the photographic event – “[the 
photographer] could not not photograph the partial object at the same 
time as the total object” is how Barthes phrases it… (WPM 100) 
 
I shall come back to the stakes of this claim for Fried. But note here that all parties to 
this debate agree, more or less, in their underlying conceptions of photography; where 
they disagree is in the conclusions they draw for its standing as art. The significance 
they attach to the fact that photographs routinely include much that was not intended 
by the photographer is a case in point: what strikes a photographer like Friedlander as 
the medium’s “generosity” may strike a critic like Scruton, hyperbolically, as making 
the photographer a “victim” of her own process, but the understanding of photography 
underlying these evaluations is the same. Note, for example, that Barthes and Scruton 
agree on this score: there is much in the photograph that the photographer cannot 
control, so could not have intended. So much the better, according to Barthes, so 
much the worse according to Scruton; for Fried, it turns out, it is rather harder to say.  
 
Call this the ‘Orthodox’ conception of photography. Underlying different 
emphases, it is the view that photography is at bottom an automatic process in which 
a mechanical apparatus, rather than a human being, is responsible for the projection of 
a three-dimensional scene onto a two-dimensional, light sensitive surface that records 
momentary states of that scene according to a set of agent-independent protocols. 
‘Agent independent’ not in the sense that photography reduces to a set of natural 
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processes – as calling photography a ‘discovery’ rather than an ‘invention’ implies – 
since human designers determine the parameters according to which cameras, lenses, 
film stocks, and computer algorithms operate; but in the sense that once initiated the 
process of image-generation takes place independently of the photographer. Call this 
the ‘encapsulation thesis:’ photographers can determine input, and they may subject 
what is output to various forms of manipulation, but the informational channel from 
input to output is impervious to human intervention. Note that this applies, mutatis 
mutandis, to digital post-production: one must first have the outputs to go to work on.  
 
Because the mechanics of photographic image-formation bypass the fallible 
mental states of human beings, it is not susceptible to false beliefs, non-systematically 
selective attention, subjective preferences, negligence or other forms of unreliability, 
epistemic or otherwise. The upshot is that photography delivers images that depend 
causally and counterfactually on what was before the camera during the moment of 
exposure. This, taken in conjunction with the laws of optics and chemistry, and how 
the variables of camera and image-processing are set, causes the photograph to look 
the way it does and, assuming all are held constant, had what was before the camera 
at the moment of exposure been different, the image would have differed accordingly.  
 
This set of assumptions is implicated by the writings of Scruton, Fried, and 
Barthes alike. For Scruton, the upshot is that while we can take an aesthetic interest in 
the objects or scene that the photograph makes perceptually available, we cannot take 
an aesthetic interest in the photograph as a representation of those objects or scene. 
For the photograph is not an expression of the artist’s thoughts or feelings about those 
objects or scene, which we might take as an object of aesthetic appreciation; it is a 
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record of how that scene looked under certain conditions. Rather than being a window 
onto the thoughts, beliefs, feelings, or intentions of the photographer, the photograph 
is a window onto the world it makes perceptually available. To this way of thinking, 
when we take what we believe is an aesthetic interest in a photograph, we unwittingly 
treat it as a surrogate for the objects or scene it makes available.  
 
This set of claims is manifestly false, but my goal is not to demonstrate this 
here; it is to point out how naturally they fall out of the standard way of conceiving 
photography.6 Though Fried is rightly critical of Scruton’s views about the possibility 
of photographic art, he actually shares the conception of photography that motivates 
them. This is hardly a claim that Fried himself would endorse, of course, but that may 
because the conception I have in mind is so pervasive, and so basic, as to seem more a 
statement of the obvious than anything amounting to a ‘theory’ properly so-called; yet 
it nonetheless entails a set of commitments about the nature of photography that can 
be traced all the way back to photography’s pioneers. Indeed, that it can may explain 
its air of self-evidence; it all but grounds contemporary folk theory of photography.7 
That he shares these underlying assumptions may explain why, for example, Fried is 
exercised by a similar set of concerns about photographic detail, notably the opacity 
to intention that photographers’ inability to fully control it is taken to occasion – even 
if he draws quite different conclusions to Scruton:  
 
As Friedlander’s remarks suggest, [John] Berger’s ‘weakness in 
intentionality’ is correlative with an extraordinary copiousness built into 
the technology (the photographer in this view always gets more than he 
or she bargained for), a feature of the medium that it has been the genius 
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of certain photographers, Friedlander among them, to exploit to the full. 
(So, whatever ‘weakness in intentionality’ means, it does not preclude 
photography being the vehicle of the strongest imaginable intentions on 
the part of gifted photographers. At the same time, it is precisely that 
feature of the ontology of the photograph that underwrites Barthes’s 
notion of the punctum.) (WPM 272) 
Such concerns only arise if one believes the standard story about photographs come 
into being is basically correct. Berger’s ‘weak intentionality’ thesis, for example, is 
the contention that photographs originate in a “single constitutive decision” on the 
part of photographers as to when to capture an image.8 That this is the extent of the 
photographer’s control over the image is as clear an expression of Orthodoxy as one 
might hope for. Fried effectively grants this thesis, with respect to the determination 
of detail, and in this he concurs with Scruton. Unlike Scruton, he does not take this to 
preclude using photography to convey “the strongest imaginable intentions.”9 Indeed, 
it is something that talented photographers exploit. This pattern of granting the basic 
assumptions of Orthodoxy, while contesting the anti-aesthetic conclusions often – 
though by no means universally – taken to follow from them, permeates Fried’s work 
on photography.10 Locating Fried’s settled position on the significance of intention for 
photography is nonetheless no simple matter, as his references to Barthes’s punctum, 
once set alongside his reading of Thomas Demand, bring out.  
 
2. An “Ontological Guarantee” of Non-theatricality: Fried’s Barthes 
 
Fried reads what is at stake in Camera Lucida – its “central thought” (WPM 95), 
whether Barthes was aware of it or not – as consonant with the animus of the anti-
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theatrical tradition that it has been one of the major goals of his own art historical 
work to trace from Diderot and 18th Century French painting through to its crisis in 
Manet’s canvases of the 1860s. Until its dramatic recasting in Manet, the central 
problem facing painters in this tradition, according to Fried, was how to secure the 
complete attention of their viewers before the work. Painters sought to do this by 
“neutraliz[ing] the primordial convention that paintings are made to be beheld” (AT 
93).11 This was to be achieved by means of their pictures’ internal drama, specifically 
their depicted figures’ intense absorption in the fictional world of the painting, rather 
than any hint self-conscious posing, staginess, or projection towards their viewers in 
the non-fictional world before the work. Only by refusing to pander to the anticipated 
presence of their works’ viewers in this way, could painters succeed in arresting those 
same viewers before the drama unfolding in their paintings.  
 
It is important to grasp that what counts (honorifically) as ‘dramatic’ rather than 
(pejoratively) as ‘theatrical’ on this narrative is a thoroughly historical variable, 
changing constantly in response to work of the recent past and its reception. This is 
why Fried calls anti-theatricality a “structure of artistic intention” on the part of artists 
and a counterpart “structure of demand, expectation, and reception” (IMAC 50) on 
the part of their audience, rather than a set of determinant properties that works do or 
do not possess once and for all. Whether a work is seen as one or the other can change 
over time, sometimes quite rapidly, in part as the result of changing artistic, social, 
and cultural sensibilities.  
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 Fried’s interpretation of Camera Lucida should be read in this light. It seeks to 
draw out those aspects of Barthes’s final book that Fried takes to be consonant with 
his own anti-theatrical commitments. For Fried, the pivotal claim comes in §20: 
 
Certain details may ‘prick’ me. If they do not, it is doubtless because the 
photographer has put them there intentionally. [T]he detail which interests 
me is not, or at least is not strictly, intentional, and probably must not be 
so; it occurs in the field of the photographed thing like a supplement that is 
at once inevitable and delightful; it does not necessarily attest to the 
photographer’s art; it says only that the photographer was there, or else, 
still more simply, that he could not not photograph the partial object at the 
same time as the total object… The Photographer’s ‘second sight’ does not 
consist in ‘seeing’ but in being there. Above all, imitating Orpheus, he 
must not turn back to look at what he is leading – what he is giving to 
me!12  
 
Fried takes the presence of a punctum, so understood, to function as “a kind of 
ontological guarantee” (WPM 102) of a photograph’s non-theatricality for Barthes. 
Unlike the studium, which operates at the level of intention and instruction, and 
circulates as part of a broader production of cultural knowledge, the punctum, in 
Fried’s formulation, is “seen but not shown” (WPM 100). As such, it cannot be a 
performance on the part of either the photographer or her subject: the latter is not 
performing, self-consciously, for the camera; the former is not performing for the 
viewer.  
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The punctum is also not something sought out by a viewer, but that “element 
which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me.”13 Barthes 
offers a bewildering variety of terms to characterise this peculiar, disorienting detail: 
it is a prick, a mark, a puncture, a point, a wound, a sting, a speck, a cut, a little hole, a 
tiny shock or detonation, a disturbance, or series of such – a photograph may even be 
“speckled” with multiple such sensitive points – before concluding: “A photograph’s 
punctum is that accident, which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).”14 
To understand a photograph’s studium, by contrast, is “inevitably to encounter the 
photographer’s intentions, to enter into harmony with them, to approve or disapprove 
of them, but always to understand them…”15 It is the  non-intentional quality of the 
punctum, one that disturbs the otherwise placid, cultural and intentional expanse of 
the studium, that fascinates Fried. 
 
In stressing the punctum’s non-intentional nature, Fried plays down both its 
affective dimension and its personal significance for Barthes himself, this being the 
canonical reading of Camera Lucida against which he pitches his own. I suspect that 
this is the aspect of Fried’s reading that is likely to strike some readers as more than a 
little motivated, given the explicitly subjective framework of Camera Lucida, and the 
highly idiosyncratic associations that Barthes adduces to several of his key examples. 
Barthes’s responses to Andre Kertész’s The Violinist’s tune. Abony, Hungary (1921) 
and James van der Zee’s The Family Portrait (1926), for example, pivot on triggering 
recollections of his youthful travels in Hungary and Romania, and memories of a sad 
‘maiden aunt,’ respectively; memories called up by the dirt road on which the blind 
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violinist walks in the former, and the thin braided gold necklace worn by one of the 
sitters in the latter.16 
  
 In the teeth of these responses, which arguably reveal more about Barthes than 
the photographs that occasion them, Fried singles out the punctum’s non-intentional 
nature – the fact that it gets into the photograph despite the photographer – as what 
does the heavy lifting in Barthes’s account. But one may wonder, especially in light 
of some of Barthes’s more gnomic pronouncements, whether the punctum is really 
‘in’ the photograph at all. “I may know better a photograph I remember than a 
photograph I am looking at,” Barthes claims, before concluding: “Ultimately – or at 
the limit – in order to see a photograph well, it is best to look away or close your 
eyes.”17 Modifying Fried, one might say that the punctum is ‘felt rather than shown;’ 
perhaps even that it is not the kind of thing that could be shown, because not in 
candidacy to be seen. But if is not to be seen, and not in the photograph, what and 
where is it? The punctum, if it may be said to reside anywhere, seems to reside in the 
affective response triggered in a particular viewer by some incidental detail in a 
photograph. Indeed the punctum appears to pick out the event of being bruised or cut 
by such a detail. Or rather, Barthes sometimes frames it in these terms – “this element 
which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow and pierces me” – only to go 
on to characterize it, as if interchangeably, as an object: “A Latin word exists to 
designate this wound, this prick, this mark made by a pointed instrument.”18 So 
understood, ‘punctum’ sometimes picks out a causal relation – what the photograph 
does to me – and at other times the wound or cut I suffer as a result. In neither case, 
however, is it simply a feature of the photograph. 
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But the innocuous detail that affects one viewer in this way need not affect 
other viewers in the same way. In the unlikely event that it does, this cannot be for the 
same reasons, unless – per impossibile – those viewers also share both their histories 
and a disposition to respond to those histories in the same way. But how many of us 
can claim sad maiden aunts with slender gold chains or to have travelled the dirt roads 
of Mitteleuropa in our impressionable youths, not to mention Barthes’s disposition to 
respond to both in certain characteristic ways? The punctum, as Barthes describes it in 
Part I of Camera Lucida, clearly implicates the associations that particular viewers 
bring to particular photographs: “Last thing about the punctum: whether or not it is 
triggered, it is an addition: it is what I add to the photograph and what is nonetheless 
already there.”19 Thus, of Lewis Hine’s Idiot Children in an Institution, New Jersey 
(1924), Barthes observes: “[W]hat I add – and what, of course is already in the image 
– is the collar, the bandage.”20 Barthes does not literally add them, of course; what he 
adds is their significance, their intense meaningfulness to him personally. 
 
That it is in the nature of such associations, being private, to be beyond the 
reach of the photographer, however, has no implications for whether the detail in the 
photograph that triggers them is or is not intended. That my associations to something 
in a photograph cannot be intentionally targeted (unless known in advance) does not 
entail that the detail itself cannot be. For how can we know that the photographer did 
not try out (could not have tried out) various necklaces, belts or pumps before settling 
on the combination that best suited his purposes? We cannot know this. What we can 
know is that the photographer could not have intended Barthes’s, or anyone else’s, 
private associations, given their highly personal nature and the fact that in many cases 
the origin of those associations will post-date the photographer’s own death. But 
 13 
whether a given piece of jewellery or clothing has such an effect is a psychological 
fact about the viewer, and his or her personal history, it is not a fact (certainly not a 
necessary fact) about what the photographer did or did not intend.21  
 
For this reason, the presence of a punctum cannot function as the kind of 
“ontological” – which I take, in this context, to mean – “cast iron” guarantee that 
Fried takes Barthes to be after. From the fact that a photograph has a punctum for me, 
I cannot infer that the detail that triggers it must have been unintended; all I can infer 
(assuming I am unknown to the photographer) is that the photographer did not intend 
whatever it is to trigger this reaction in me. Conversely, from the fact that a 
photograph has no punctum for me, I cannot infer that everything in it must have been 
intended; all I can infer is that there is nothing in it, intended or otherwise, given my 
history and disposition to respond in certain ways, to so affect me. 
 
Everything that I have said so far assumes that Fried gets Barthes basically 
right on the question of intention. But what if he does not? Those who find Fried’s 
reading motivated, in downplaying Barthes’s own stress on subjective experience in 
favour of the non-theatrical because unintended detail, will think that he is hardening 
up Barthes claims in the service of his own project. And this is true. What Barthes 
says in §20 is typically weaker than the more trenchant views that Fried attributes to 
him. Thus Fried stresses Barthes’s opening remark: “certain details may ‘prick’ me. If 
they do not it is doubtless because the photographer has put them there intentionally.” 
But Barthes himself continues: “the detail that interests me is not, or at least is not 
strictly, intentional, and probably must not be so… it does not necessarily attest to the 
photographer’s art” (my italics). This is considerably more hedged with qualifications 
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than Fried’s interpretation would suggest, and correspondingly more defensible. But 
this is hardly news; it is a standard trope of strong reading. 
 
An alternative response is offered by Walter Benn Michaels, who grants 
Fried’s interpretation, but takes the remarks he alights upon as pointing to a quite 
different conclusion to the one that Fried himself draws. For Michaels, Barthes’s 
commitment to subjective experience – such that what a photograph means to you 
need have no bearing upon what (if anything) it means to me or, indeed, whatever it 
may have been intended to mean by the photographer – should be regarded as of a 
piece with the literalist stress on subjective experience to which Fried is otherwise so 
opposed. If a literalist work is structurally incomplete without the participation of its 
animating subject, to the extent that the ‘participant viewer’ is not only a component 
of the work, but the work can be said to reduce to the experience it elicits in a given 
subject, then it becomes hard not to read Barthes’s valorization of the punctum as an 
expression of a literalist sensibility.22 For on Barthes’s account, a moving photograph 
is not merely incomplete but inert without a particular viewer’s response to bring it to 
life.23 Barthes’s consignment of the entire realm of intention, otherwise so valorized 
by Fried, to the preserve of studium makes it hard to see Barthes – champion of the 
reader’s birth from the ashes of the author’s death – and Fried as fellow travellers in 
any obvious sense. By bracketing the photographer’s intentions in favour of the 
viewer’s response, Barthes seems to identify what is valuable in photography, as he 
understands it, with what is meretricious in minimalism, as Fried understands it.24 It is 
not clear what we should make of this, but Fried’s reading of Demand’s photographs 
as “images of sheer authorial intention” sheds an interesting sidelight on these issues. 
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3. “Allegories of Intendedness as Such:” Fried’s Demand 
 
As is well known, Demand makes his images by photographing models and sets that 
he and his assistants construct from paper and card. These constructions are typically 
based on images derived from newspapers and magazines of seemingly anodyne or 
undistinguished looking places. Though sometimes referred to as ‘crime scenes’ they 
are as often places in which events of some social, political, or historical importance 
have taken place: the tiny kitchen in Tikrit used by Saddam Hussein while hiding 
from US Armed Forces; the Emergency Operations Center in Palm Beach, Florida, in 
which the infamous ‘hanging chads’ from the Al Gore versus George W. Bush 
election were examined; the aftermath of Claus von Stauffenberg’s failed bomb plot 
against Hitler in July 1944; the looted offices of the Stasi following the collapse of the 
GDR; the corridor of the Milwaukee apartment block in which the notorious serial 
killer Jeffrey Dahmer committed his crimes; and so on.  
 
From such socially or politically charged scenes Demand makes images that 
seem almost pointedly cold and lifeless. Barthes would no doubt have hated them – 
no punctum, and certainly no “blind field,” or so it would seem. The question Fried 
poses is simple, but fundamental: Why? Why go to so much trouble to produce images 
that not only purge their referents of most of their identifying features, but remove all 
signs of everyday wear and tear, and more general historical accretions, that might 
distinguish them from other such objects and scenes? For the upshot is images that, in 
at least one respect, resemble one another more than they do the scenes from which 
they derive – for whatever is rendered, it is rendered in the same anodyne fashion.  
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The answer Fried gives eschews any reference to the deadening effect of 
mediated images on our lives, or our engagement with politics and history, and 
instead situates Demand’s way of making photographs as a refutation of standard 
worries about photography’s ‘weak intentionality.’25 According to Fried, Demand 
addresses the standard worry head on, by assuming responsibility for everything that 
appears in his images. There is no possibility of a punctum in such images, as Fried 
reads Barthes, because there is no room for the unintended detail: after all, if Demand 
or his assistants had not made and positioned whatever it is just so, it could not have 
shown up in the image in the way that it does. The upshot is images that express a 
commitment to the very idea of intendedness: “Demand’s aim is not to make a wholly 
intended object [Fried is thinking of the control that digital technologies are widely 
believed to afford], but rather to make pictures that represent or indeed allegorize 
intendedness as such, and this turns out to require exploiting the ‘weakness’ of the 
traditional photographic image precisely in that regard” (WPM 272). 
 
Demand does this by leveraging our knowledge that his images are 
straightforward documents of what was before the camera at the moment of exposure 
– as all photographs must be on the Orthodox account. As such, his images are bound 
to record, impartially and non-selectively, whatever was in frame at the moment of 
exposure. But given that they can thereby record only what Demand and his assistants 
are responsible for, they remain monuments to Demand’s intentions nonetheless. The 
imperviousness of such images to unintended details of the kind that are ‘seen but not 
shown’ could hardly be clearer. Fried’s reasoning fully accords with that of Barthes 
and Scruton here: Demand may succeed where Scruton claims photography must fail, 
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but it is only because photography does indeed suffer – or so at least it is thought 
– from the problem that Scruton identifies that a demonstration such as Demand’s has 
bite. Demand’s practice, as Michaels notes, would make little sense in painting; that 
painting is intentional is not exactly news.26 Similarly, it is only because photography 
is widely believed to suffer such an intentional deficit that – anomalous practices like 
Demand’s aside – the punctum remains a standing possibility. That Fried shares these 
widely held beliefs about photography goes some way to explaining why he reads 
Demand’s images as he does. If he did not, there would be less to get excited about in 
such a demonstration:  
 
Simply put, [Demand] aims above all to replace the original scene of 
evidentiary traces and marks of human use – the historical world in all its 
all its layeredness and compositeness – with images of sheer authorial 
intention, although the very bizarreness of the fact that the scenes and 
objects of the photographs, despite their initial appearance of quotidian 
‘reality,’ have all been constructed by the artist throws into conceptual 
relief the determining force (also the inscrutability, one might almost say 
the opacity) of the intention behind it… 
[P]erhaps the best that can be said is that Demand seeks to make 
pictures that thematize or indeed allegorize intendedness as such…27 
 
This curious dialectic between allegorizing intention as such and thereby rendering 
the artist’s actual intentions – I take this to refer to Demand’s reasons for allegorizing 
intention as such, or what he might mean by doing so – opaque or inscrutable strikes 
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me as the most intriguing aspect of this reading. Those familiar with Fried’s early 
criticism cannot but hear an echo of his celebration of Anthony Caro here: “It is as 
though Caro’s sculptures essentialize meaningfulness as such – as though the 
possibility of meaning what we say and do alone makes his sculpture possible” (AO 
162). “Essentializing meaningfulness as such” – that is, not projecting this or that 
particular meaning, but an understanding of what it is to be capable of meaning at all 
– is clearly a close cousin of “allegorizing intendedness as such.” Both involve not so 
much a particular act of intending or meaning, as foregrounding what is distinctively 
human about the capacity for intending or meaning (our lives, actions, or utterances) 
at all.28 This commonality is hardly coincidental. For both are pitched in Fried’s mind 
against the literalist disavowal of final responsibility for their work’s meaning, and its 
theatrical projection towards the anticipated spectator required to complete it instead.  
 
 Though Demand’s practice seems, at least morphologically, a much less 
obvious candidate to counter-pose to minimalism than Caro’s, focusing narrowly on 
morphology would be to miss Fried’s point. Fried’s account of the contrast between 
taking responsibility for a work’s internal relations, by fully intending them to be as 
they are, rather than any other way, versus a situation in which “although conditioned 
in a general way by the circumstances of exhibition,” the relationships set up between 
work and beholder on any given occasion are understood as “emphatically not 
determined by the work itself, and therefore as not intended as such by its maker,” 
suggests it is more a matter of the respective practices’ attitude or spirit.29 Literalists 
such as Carl Andre and Robert Morris, according to Fried, were masters at creating 
theatrical installations to be completed by their anticipated viewers’ passage through 
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them. But while the meta-intentions animating their installations may have been clear, 
the meaning of individual works within them was left open to viewers to determine.  
 
But consider Demand’s images again in this light. Demand’s practice of 
photographically documenting paper and card reconstructions of existing photographs 
may express a strong commitment to artistic intentionality for all the reasons Fried 
gives, but what about the meaning of individual works? The works themselves seem 
to be reduced to ciphers for the meta-intention animating the project as a whole on 
this account. While the corpus emerges as something expressing a clear artistic 
purpose, the meaning of individual works within it remains blank: cold, alienating, 
inscrutable, opaque. Isn’t something very similar true of minimalism? From Fried’s 
perspective, one wonders why such opacity of meaning, at the level of the individual 
work, does not raise the worry that it invites viewers to project their own, subjective 
interpretations – whatever these may be – upon them. 
 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the meaning of Demand’s images can – 
or should – be reduced to whatever subjective associations they happen to trigger in 
the individual viewer, in the way that the punctum clearly does on Barthes account; 
but, rather, that what Demand means by showing us (say) a pared down view of the  
hallway outside Jeffrey Dahmer’s apartment, or a depopulated view of the aftermath 
of the failed Valkyrie bomb plot against Hitler, remains opaque. Are we supposed to 
take the two images – produced according to the same general intention, if Fried is 
right – as on a par? Are we being invited to view, say, Dahmer’s crimes as somehow 
comparable to a failed bomb plot that might have ended the War a year earlier and, if 
so, according to what possible reasoning? We are left none the wiser as to what 
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individual works might mean, however strong a case Fried makes for the intentions 
underlying the project as whole. That is, the ways it might matter that Demand chose 
this image rather than that to reconstruct, of this event rather than that and, perhaps 
especially, why he made these rather than any other editorial decisions in their 
transcriptions.30 This seems to align Demand’s practice with minimalism, rather than 
vice versa. If what we are to make of specific images remains this indeterminate, it is 
hard to see Demand’s practice as “fundamentally, not to say hyperbolically, opposed 
to the literalist attitude.”31 For the minimalists, by Fried’s own account, had just as 
strong a general intention – to create a theatrical mis-en-scène to be activated by the 
viewer’s presence – while leaving it up to viewers to decide what to make of the 
works themselves. 
 
A common elision may underlie this result: Fried’s reading reduces the 
meaning of Demand’s works to that of the intention animating the project as a whole. 
The sticking point may be an ambiguity in the notion of intentionality itself, 
especially as used in debates about art. Scruton makes essentially the same reduction, 
albeit in the course of underplaying, rather than celebrating, the role of intentionality 
in photography. When Scruton claims that the causal basis of photography precludes 
intentionality, he conceives it in such a way as to rule out both expressing a thought 
about or attitude towards what is depicted by means of the way it is depicted (the 
possibility that photographs have meanings or that photographers can use them to 
express meanings) and photographs themselves being products of intentional action 
(the possibility that photography as an activity could be fully agential). But these are 
distinct in ways that Scruton’s account fails to acknowledge. Expressing a thought or 
attitude is often intentional, but need not be: a Royal portrait may betray an attitude 
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towards the sitter (‘power corrupts’) – this would be part of the work’s meaning – that 
the court artist might not be aware of holding, and certainly does not intend to express 
if she is. And there are a great many intentional actions, such as tying one’s shoes or 
cutting one’s food, that need not express any attitude towards a mental content. 
Fried’s reading of Demand makes the same reduction. It reduces the question of what 
individual images mean to the question of what Demand intends by making images in 
this way, thereby rendering the former opaque: 
 
[T]he primacy of experience… meant that meaning in literalism was 
essentially indeterminate, every subject’s necessarily unique response to 
a given work-in-a-situation standing on an equal footing with every 
other’s. Viewed against this background, Demand’s project… comes into 
intellectual focus… Simply, put he aims above all to replace the original 
scene of evidentiary traces and marks of human use… with images of 
sheer authorial intention.”32  
 
Fried views Demand’s stress on intention as a response to what he perceives as the 
minimalists’ failure to take responsibility for their work’s meaning. My point is that 
not only can these not be identified (since they often come apart) but that Demand’s 
emphasis on intention over meaning, notably the ways in which the former seems to 
come at the cost of the latter, if Fried is right, might instead be regarded as consistent 
with minimalism. Certainly, nothing in Fried’s interpretation rules this out. 
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4. The Original Problem Reconsidered 
 
I want to conclude by noting a basic tension between Fried’s reading of Barthes and 
Demand, before considering what might explain it. Recall that, according to Fried, 
Barthes wants the punctum to function as “ontological guarantee” of a photograph’s 
non-theatricality, because it pertains to a marginal detail that could not have been 
intended. The modal nature of this claim is key: it is because this detail cannot have 
been intended that the punctum is even in candidacy to serve as a guarantee of this 
kind. But the claim in this modal form is false: we cannot know that the detail was not 
intended; all we can know is that the associations that a given detail may or may not 
provoke in a given viewer, being private, could not have been intended. And this 
seems, as Michaels notes, to align Barthes with, rather than against, literalism.  
 
On Fried’s reading of Demand, by contrast, it is the fact that everything in the 
photograph is only there because the photographer put it there, the fact that his images 
are fully intended, that is supposed to resist the threat of theatricality. By constructing 
his ‘allegories of intendedness’ from the ground up, Demand forecloses the possibility 
exploited by literalism that each viewer might make what they will of his images. I 
have argued that much in Fried’s own reading suggests the opposite; as Fried reads 
Demand, the meta-intention animating the project as a whole is clear, but what any 
specific image within it might mean is rendered curiously opaque. In effect, intention 
comes at the cost of meaning. 
 
So much for my criticisms: set aside the question of whether either is on target 
and return to Fried’s claims. Taken at face value, they certainly seem to be 
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contradictory: on the one hand, we have the non-theatrical as what cannot have been 
intended, and on the other we have the non-theatrical as what must be fully intended. 
Can the contradiction be defused? A philosopher’s solution might be: the punctum is 
sufficient but cannot be necessary to defeat theatricality, since Demand’s photographs 
succeed in doing so despite being bereft of puncta. So having a punctum suffices to 
rule out theatricality, but is not required to do so. To take an obvious example: 
modernist painting and sculpture resist theatricality on Fried’s account, but not by 
virtue of possessing puncta. Although consistent with what Fried says, this does not 
help with questions internal to photography; and whatever may be true of Demand’s 
practice is unlikely to generalize, given its idiosyncratic nature.  
 
An alternative solution would be to see whether the idea of theatricality is 
being used in a number of different ways that do not always align.33 In Fried’sreading 
of Barthes, ‘theatricality’ picks out the way in which a photograph might be thought 
to perform for, pander to, or be otherwise projected towards a viewer; if the detail that 
touches the viewer is not intended it cannot be such a performance. In his account of 
Demand, ‘theatricality’ picks out the way in which a work might be thought to depend 
on the viewer for its completion; Demand’s work is anti-theatrical because it does not 
leave this open. I have taken issue with each of these claims separately, but the salient 
point here is that while these two descriptions of theatricality – being self-consciously 
directed towards the viewer, and requiring a viewer for the work’s completion – do 
not come to quite the same thing, since something that is already complete in itself 
can nonetheless be directed towards an audience, and something can be incomplete in 
other ways, without being so directed, they are clearly consistent. They pick out two 
ways in which a work or image might be thought to ‘wait upon’ its viewer.  
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This is the core of the idea, and while what counts as theatrical may have 
changed down the years, as has the term’s relation to others in the Friedian corpus, 
this much has been clear from the get go. But therein lies the deeper problem; for if 
the idea of theatricality is being used consistently throughout, how could one and the 
same relation be defeated both by an image being unintended and by an image being 
fully intended? It is hard to see how both claims could be true.  
 
But could this perception result from not taking Fried’s own account of the 
historical vicissitudes of theatricality seriously enough? Given that Fried stresses the 
historical nature of what counts as theatricality – take the contrast between Chardin 
and Manet – need there be any contradiction in claiming that this can be achieved in 
different ways in Barthes and Demand? This is a serious response, but it nonetheless 
misidentifies the worry. I am not claiming that there is any conflict in what counts as 
theatrical on Fried’s account of Barthes and Demand; indeed my point arises from 
acknowledging that there is not. Rather, the tension resides in how theatricality relates 
to intentionality. It concerns whether it is coherent to characterise theatricality as both 
the kind of thing that can only be defeated intentionally, and the kind of thing that can 
only be defeated unintentionally. The analogy to Chardin and Manet is thus 
misplaced; not only is there no conflict between what counts as theatrical in Fried’s 
accounts of Barthes and Demand, but it is questionable whether they are even 
concerned with (or engaged in) the same activity. Barthes is interested in vernacular 
photographs that are expressly not works of art; Demand makes photographs in a way 
that would make no sense outside the artworld. It seems equally implausible to see 
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Demand as in dialogue with Barthes as it does to think of Demand as reconfiguring an 
entire artistic tradition in the way that Manet’s epochal canvases of the 1860s did.  
 
The conflict with respect to theatricality’s conditions of possibility remains. 
My suggestion for defusing it straightforward: Fried should give up trying to recruit 
Barthes for the anti-theatrical cause; that the punctum is structurally incomplete until 
activated by a particular viewer required for its completion could not be clearer. With 
this the inconsistency dissolves: Barthes’s celebration of the punctum (though not his 
account of photography per se) is theatrical, because non-unary photographs require 
particular viewers for their completion; Demand’s work is not, because it does not put 
the same burden on its viewers. If I remain to be persuaded that the latter claim is in 
fact true, that amounts to a critical difference with Fried; it has no implications for the 
consistency of his theory. There is no doubt more to say about what specific Demands 
might mean; it simply remains to be demonstrated either way. 
 
 The tension between Fried’s treatments of Barthes and Demand prompts an 
interesting question: could there be a punctum in Demand? Prima facie, the answer 
would seem to be no. If everything is intended how could there be a punctum, when 
that requires some unintended detail to be seen despite not being shown? But if, as I 
have argued, it is only one’s private associations that cannot be intended, then nothing 
prevents even images as ‘saturated’ with intention as Demand’s from triggering 
unexpected responses in their viewers. Perhaps this seems unlikely, but consider the 
viewer who, as a child, spent long summer evenings with her maternal grandfather 
(now deceased) building elaborate dolls houses from wood and card – ein typisch 
deutscher Zeitvertrieb. For such a viewer, certain imperfections – a way of joining 
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two cardboard facets to create an edge, perhaps indicative of an unsteady (elderly?) 
hand, or a youthful haste to finish before being called to table – may one day trigger 
associations and memories long since forgotten, perhaps a whole Proustian armature 
of gut bürgerliche Küche, the pervasive aroma of pipe smoke, muffled sounds from 
the neighbourhood Spielplatz. Perhaps this viewer may one day feel all this ‘with her 
whole body’ on coming across some insignificant detail that no one else might notice, 
let alone see fit to remark, in a work by Demand.34 Note that, if she does, her response 
would have nothing to do with the meaning of the work that triggers it and, in this, it 
would be no more wide of the mark than Barthes’s responses to Kertész or Van der 
Zee in its idiosyncrasies.  
 
But my title refers to the ‘so-called’ problem of detail in photography. How 
does all this bear on that problem? Throughout I have noted the respects in which the 
three views under consideration implicate what I call the ‘Orthodox’ conception of 
photography. It is the associated view of restricted photographic agency (Berger’s 
‘weakness in intentionality’) that brings in train the usual worries about photographers 
being unable to exert sufficient control of their images, and how far this compromises 
their standing as art. This may be most obvious in Scruton, but it is equally true of the 
assumptions driving Barthes’s understanding of the punctum, in both its formulations, 
and Fried’s take on the significance of intention in Barthes and Demand respectively.  
 
Could Fried’s commitment to this view be responsible for some of the tensions I have 
diagnosed here? It is only because Fried and Michaels are committed to this view, for 
example, that they see photography as the contemporary terrain on which the dialectic 
between art and objecthood plays out. In their exchange about the respects in which 
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photographs might be understood as traces, imprints or fossils rather than pictures of 
their referents proper – the Orthodox view in nuce – Fried remarks: “this basic feature 
of photographs can be taken as raising fundamental doubts about their status as works 
of art: is not a mechanically produced artefact… closer in essence (closer 
ontologically) to an object than to any kind of representation?” (WPM 335-6).35 That 
is, the mechanical nature of photographic image-generation pushes its products closer 
to mere artefactuality, or objecthood simpliciter. Hence the title of Fried’s book on 
photography: when the photographic tableau became a staple of contemporary artistic 
production, the need to defeat objecthood became the internal motor animating 
photographic art. Because what makes photography photography – according to the 
Orthodox account – calls into question its standing as art, it is the natural site for this 
showdown today. None of this follows, of course, if one does not share Fried’s basic 
modernist outlook, but in that case the competing claims simply pass one another by. 
But even from within Fried’s perspective, these claims would be put in question if any 
of the assumptions about the nature of photography underpinning Orthodoxy turned 
out to be mistaken.36 And they do. 
 
Perhaps the key respect in which they are mistaken concerns the conditions 
required for a photograph to come into existence. It is standardly assumed that a 
photograph comes into existence when a light sensitive surface is exposed to light. 
This is why the photographer’s agency is, on this view, strictly speaking external to 
what makes a process photographic; it is not internal to the formation of the image 
itself. In the typically brief, but nonetheless decisive, moment in which information 
from the scene is being recorded, the photographer’s beliefs, intentions, and desires 
are irrelevant; what determines what will show up in the final image is what was in 
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fact before the camera, in conjunction with lighting, film stock, camera variables and 
so on, applied. But this foundational assumption – as common to folk theory as it is to 
Orthodoxy proper – turns out, on inspection, to be false.  
 
In the case of analogue photography, exposing the film to light creates a latent 
image, but the film needs to be processed before that image becomes visible. Open 
the camera back in a misguided attempt to see the image, prior to processing, and all 
one will succeed in doing is fogging the film. Moreover, if the film in question is 
negative or colour reversal, it not only needs to be processed; it also has to be printed 
before it can be appreciated by anyone other than a specialist lab technician – and 
then only with respect to technical variables such as exposure, density, saturation and 
the like. In the case of digital photography, exposing the camera’s CCD sensor to 
light causes the capacitors that make up its surface to transmit electrical charges; but 
the charged or uncharged state of those capacitors not only needs to be recorded in 
binary form, the resulting code has to be fed through several stages of software 
processing before it will generate a visible image. This process, though too quick to 
be humanly detected, nonetheless comprises distinct stages that can be distinguished 
both functionally and conceptually: output the same code through a different set of 
algorithms and it need not generate an image file. Processed differently, the same 
strings of 0s and 1s could be output as sound, and this shows there is a distinction to 
be drawn between the information stored and the algorithms required to output that 
information in visual form. In neither the analogue nor the digital case is a photograph 
generated simply by exposing a light sensitive surface to light. More is required.  
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Why does this matter? It matters, for philosophy and theory of photography 
alike, because it means that the photographer can invest his or her agency in any of 
the stages necessary for the production of an image that can be visually appreciated, 
and have what he or she thereby does still count as strictly photographic. Since neither 
the formation of a light image on camera’s film plain or censor, nor the recording of a 
momentary state of that light image are, even taken together, sufficient to generate a 
photograph – if that requires something amenable to visual appreciation – then any 
subsequent stage of image processing, without which there could be no image, must 
be internal to photography stricto sensu. If one cannot generate a photograph without 
such means, they can hardly be incidental to photography proper. Consider standard 
darkroom practices or digital post-production in this light; these can, but need not, be 
automated; indeed for much of photography’s history neither was. And when they are 
not – which is to say, when a photographer chooses to invest his or her agency in the 
rendering stage of the photographic process, then the photographer can exert as much 
or as a little – strictly photographic – control over detail as he or she likes. There is 
nothing epochal about digital processing in this regard, for all the millennialism that 
greeting its widespread uptake by artists some quarter century ago. In sum: there is, 
and never has been, any peculiarly photographic problem of detail. Instead, we might 
say, a certain picture held us captive. It seems that at least Jeff Wall agrees.37  
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